，Alex Waymanfs The Lion 's Roar of Queen Srimala (1974) . This is not the place to review all of this research in detail. Rather, let me briefly indi cate the problematics involved in an investigation of the historical development of Buddhist thought so that we might be able to understand the significance of Tathagatagarbha thought within that context. Although Buddhism originated in India, it underwent a domesti cation in China and Japan, accommodating concrete historical needs and circumstances in those countries. According to a remark of Edward Conze, the late British Buddhologist, the limitation of not knowing Chinese and Japanese T T is not as serious as it sounds.
Most creative work was done in India.
• .t! (Conze 1962) . While there are no doubt those who would agree with him, those of us who have access to Chinese and Japanese sources know better.
New dimensions of thought and certainly ^creative workT I emerged from the minds of the Chinese and Japanese in the course of Buddhism^ domestication. There is simply no way to understand the transmission of Buddhism through this historical process without taking seriously a comparative philological study of Buddhist texts extant in Sanskrit and Pali and in the Chinese and Tibetan translations, as well as contemporary Japanese Buddhological works based upon such philological studies. But caution is required here, for, even though a comparative philological study of this kind enables us to expose errors in the translating of techni cal terms and the interpreting of ideas in their transposition from the original Indian sources, it would be imprudent to challenge the validity of a given religious tradition simply on the basis of textual orthodoxy. A. tradition, after all, represents a living reli gion that has inspired those living within it, in spite of the fact that they may lack the benefits of a modern philological discipline.
Quite the contrary, they may even have been more deeply inspired precisely because they were graced with not knowing about modern philological methods. In a word, skill-in-means has always marked the transmission of the Dharma-
The term nskill-in-means!! does not mean "anything goes.'1 It is an ability to implement insight (into emptiness, ^unyata) at the level of secular reality. It presupposes an understanding of the principle of the inseparability of emptiness and co-arising, of truth and practice, a matter of which we shall have more to say later.
The domestication of Buddhism in East Asia, as in other cultural environments, owes much to this skill-in-means in its propagation of the Dharma. The significance of Buddhism in East Asia, then, begins with the fact that it is a living religion, not simply a philo logical or philosophical asset monopolized by an intelligentsia dedicated to a critical examination of the noetic contents of Buddhist thought and the philological validity of its expression.
Buddhism has established deep roots among the masses and within their culture quite apart from all the philological errors committed during the process of domestication. And most important of all, it is a tradition that has survived the overwhelming pressures of modernization.
The trouble with Buddhologists today is that they have become specialists in a given set of texts within a particular lineage or in a given system of thought. As a result, the issue of the relevance of those texts or that system of thought to the culture and thought of the people who were influenced by them seems to have eluded their attention. I make this point because Tathagatagarbha thought provides one of the most significant bases for the develop ment of popular living schools of Buddhism like Zen and Pure
Land.
This leads us to examine two questions, one historical and the other doctrinal: whether Tathagatagarbha constituted an indepen dent school of thought in India or not, and whether it is a form of monism or not. After examining these two issues, I will attempt an interpretation of Tathagatagarbha thought from a Madhyamika perspective and then turn to a discussion of Tathagatagarbha thought as a basis of Mahayana Buddhist devotionalism in East Asia. In conclusion I will take up the question of the identity of the tathagata~garbha and the alaya consciousness, which some Mahayana texts propose without explanation. My comments on this particular issue are highly speculative, but I find it a matter that must eventually be faced in order to gain a clear understanding of the significance of Tathagatagarbha thought.
IS T A T H A G A T A G A R B H A AN INDEPENDENT S C H O O L ?
Takasaki 
IS T A T H A G A T A G A R B H A A MONISM?
ObermillerTs attempt to identify Tathagatagarbha On the other hand, the late Yamaguchi Susumu summed up the Ratnagotravibhaga by analyzing its contents in seven thematic categories:1 ) Buddha, 2) Dharma, 3) Samgha, 4) dhatu (body, realm or element, but here the term !IelennentT T is most proper), 5) bodhi (wisdom), 6) guna (merits), and 7) karma (act). He argued that dhatu is the "cause,T T and bodhit gima, and karma the "conditions" that empirically reveal the three jewels of Buddha, Dharma, and Samgha" (1955, p. 4) . This means that the wisdom, merits, and practices of a bodhisattva constitute the "conditions" that "cause" the three jewels. And because the Buddha is of the foremost importance among the three jewels, we can rephrase the above expression as "the wisdom, merits, and practices of a bodhisattva constitute the conditions which !causeT the Buddha." The term (1953, p, 7) . These views, as should now be apparent, all correspond to
Yamaguchifs view that the tathagata-garbha reperesents the embodiment of co-arising in the sense that the potential to realize the true reality of the relativity of all things is inherent in human eonsciousness.
Is Tathagatagarbha thought then a form of monism? It is so only if we are to conceive monism as a principle. Whether coarising can be construed as a primordial substance is another matter, because co-arising precludes the notion of a first cause.
Thus although tatha ga ta -ga rbha literally refers to the Tathagatha embryo, the term implies something that is not readily per'
ceived. It is hidden by ignorance (avidya). It refers to a potential.
While it is commonly said that tatha ga ta -ga rbha is hidden within sentient beings, what is actually meant therefore is that sentient (1966, p. 26) . But emptiness is not nihilism, as these learned men seem to think it is. On the contrary, it is char acterized by a dynamic thrust toward empirical reality, which is what co-arising, the corollary of emptiness, is all about.
The popular Heart Sutra therefore says, ,!form is emptiness and emptiness is formn because form is conventionally established by the principle of co-arising which emptiness makes possible.
Deriving many of his ideas from the Prajnaparamitasutra, Nagarjuna says in his invocational statement in the Madhyamakakarika:
I pay homage to the Buddha, the most supreme teacher, who has taught that [co-arising, which is] neither organiza tion nor extinction, neither permanence nor impermanence, neither unity nor diversity, neither coming nor going, extin guishes meaningless argument (prapafica) (T. 30, number 1564, p . 1).
Emptiness is described here through a series of negations. Its func tion is to extinguish ,Tmeaningless argument^ based on the notion of a duality notion that fragments the world into concepts by making the self the 丨 neasuring stick of the world and to enable one to understand that the true nature of existence is co-arising. Thus 
T A T H A G A T A G A R B H A T H O U G H T AS A BASIS O F M A H A Y A N A DE VO TIO N A LISM
In many Mahayana texts, for example, the /Wanayanasamgraha, Lafikavatara, as well in Buddhist Tantric texts, the terms nisyanda- -nisyanda-buddha, dharmata-nisyanda, and dharmadhatu-nisyanda are frequently observed. The term nisyanda, as we find it in the Mahay5nasarjigraha, for example, refers to the outflow of the Dharma (T. 3 1 , number 1594， p. 151c). Tathagata garbha related texts use the same term, but with a somewhat different meaning. In the former, the Dharma is objectified and assumed to possess the power to penetrate all quarters of the universe. In the latter, the Dharma is internalized and assumed to be inherent in all human beings, whence it flows out to penetrate all quarters of the universe. When I speak of an "internalized Dharma," I refer to the fact that the Dharma has become an integral part of a personality. I speak of Tathagatagarbha Yet, the supposition underlying both Zen and Pure Land is the same: the acceptance of tathagata-garbha as the internalized Dharma, The difference between the two is that whereas the former is based on the proposition that the True Dharma (正法 shobo) is always present, the latter is based on the proposition that the Final Dharma ( 末法 mapp5) is always present. Pure Land is tariki because it believes that in the mappo era, /iri/ci (meditational practice and adherence to orthodox discipline) is meaning less. It is based on the supposition that humankind is inherently ltwicked,t ! deprived of the potential to realize enlightenment.
Hence it proposes skill-in-means, that is, faith in Buddha Amitabha. Faith in Amitabha requires the complete renunciation of self. The Pure Land theory of salvation requires a shift from bodhisattva practice (jiriki) to faith in Amitabha (tariki), a shift from the notion that humankind is subject to karmic transmigration to the notion of dependence on Bodhisattva Dharmakara!s vow of universal salvation, a shift from r fseeingr t tathagatagarbha within oneself to "seeing" it in Bodhisattva Dharmakara.
Despite these variations, Tathagatagarbha thought is always based on the acceptance of the power of the Buddha, the "inevi table consequence" of the synergistic nature that characterizes the True Dharma. It is the same power, the same Dharma, that is described in the P rajfia pa ra m ita scriptures, the Vimalaklrtinirde^a, 
